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ARE THE OUTWARD PROCESSING 
PROVISIONS IN THE SOUTH KOREAN 
FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS CONSISTENT 
WITH THE LAW OF THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION? 
Pierce Lee* † 
Abstract: In recent years, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) has en-
tered into many free trade agreements (FTAs) that contain special provi-
sions—outward processing (OP) provisions—that extend the benefit of 
preferential tariff rates to the products manufactured or processed in the 
Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC). OP refers to the temporary exporta-
tion of goods for additional processing and the KIC is an outward proc-
essing zone in the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea) 
where South Korean companies are allowed to establish manufacturing 
plants and to employ North Korean labor. As “temporary” indicates, the 
finished goods are always imported back to South Korea for domestic 
consumption or permanent exportation. Currently, South Korea does not 
impose any tariff on North Korean products because the South Korean 
government regards inter-Korean trade as “trade within a nation.” Other 
countries, however, do not consider the two Koreas as one customs terri-
tory and treat products that have been processed in the KIC as North Ko-
rean goods. This treatment of products that have been processed in the 
KIC as originating in North Korea harms the exporters of goods proc-
essed in the KIC because North Korea is not a member of the World 
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Trade Organization (WTO) and therefore products originating in North 
Korea are not entitled to most-favored nation (MFN) rates of duty. In or-
der to solve this problem, South Korea has included OP provisions in its 
FTAs with other nations. These OP provisions explicitly stipulate that 
goods that undergo processing in the KIC originate in South Korea, and 
are thus afforded the preferential rates under the FTAs. This article ad-
dresses the main concern with regard to these OP provisions: whether 
South Korea’s FTA partners have violated the MFN principle by applying 
the OP provisions to products processed in the KIC, reducing tariffs on 
Kaesong products, while not offering similar benefits to the products un-
dergoing OP in other countries. This article argues that a WTO member 
nation could file a successful complaint against South Korea’s FTA part-
ners because the South Korean OP provisions are discriminatory, and 
thus in violation of the MFN principle. Additionally, neither South Korea 
nor one of its FTA partners has any successful defense, including a de-
fense under WTO Article XXIV. 
Introduction 
 In recent years, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) has entered 
into many free trade agreements (FTAs) with other countries.1 Some of 
those FTAs contain outward processing (OP) provisions.2 Outward 
processing is when goods are temporarily exported to another country 
for additional processing, and then returned to their country of origin 
before being consumed or exported.3 The OP provisions in the South 
Korean FTAs are designed to extend the benefit of duty-free trade to 
the products manufactured or processed in the Kaesong Industrial 
                                                                                                                      
1 See Han-gu-gui FTA chu-jin-hyeon-hwang [Current Status of Korean FTAs], 
OAE-GYO-TONG-SANG-BU [Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of 
Korea], http://www.fta.go.kr/new/ftakorea/ftakorea2010.asp (last visited Jan. 28, 2013) 
[hereinafter Korean FTA Status]. Between 1999 and 2012, South Korea has entered into 
ten free trade areas (FTAs) with the following countries or trade blocs: Chile, Singapore, 
the European Trade Association (EFTA), the Association of Southeast Asian Nation 
(ASEAN), India, the European Union (EU), Peru, the United States, Turkey, and Colom-
bia. Id. 
2 Ho Cheol Kim, Does Annex 22-B of the Proposed United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement 
Contemplate and Allow for Trade with Respect to North Korea?, 40 Geo. J. Int’l L. 67, 78 (2008). 
3 See The International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Cus-
toms Procedures, May 18, 1973, S. Treaty Doc. No. 97-23, 950 U.N.T.S. 269 [hereinafter 
Kyoto Convention]; Protocol of Amendment to the International Convention on the Sim-
plification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures, specific annex F chp. 1 E2./F1, 
June 26, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. 108-6, 2370 U.N.T.S. 27 [hereinafter Revised Kyoto Conven-
tion]. 
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Complex (KIC).4 The KIC is an outward processing zone (OPZ) in the 
People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea) where South 
Korean companies are allowed to establish manufacturing plants and 
employ North Korean labor.5 
 Currently, South Korea does not impose any tariff on the products 
that are processed in the KIC because the South Korean government 
regards inter-Korean trade as “internal trading within a nation.”6 Other 
countries, however, do not consider the two Koreas as one customs ter-
ritory and treat any products that have been processed in the KIC as 
originating in North Korea.7 This harms exporters of products that 
have been processed in the KIC because North Korea is not a member 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO).8 Since North Korea is not a 
member of the WTO, products originating in North Korea are not enti-
tled to most-favored nation (MFN) rates of duty. 9 
 In order to solve this problem, South Korea has included OP pro-
visions in its FTAs with other countries.10 These OP provisions explicitly 
stipulate that goods that undergo processing in the KIC “originate” in 
South Korea for the purposes of determining their treatment under 
the applicable FTA.11 With the aid of the OP provisions, these goods 
                                                                                                                      
4 OP provisions are contained in the FTAs entered into between South Korea and the 
following countries or trade blocs: ASEAN, Singapore, India, EFTA, Peru, and Colombia. 
See Korean FTA Status, supra note 1; Mark E. Manyin & Dick K. Nanto, Cong. Research 
Serv., RL34093, The Kaesong North-South Korean Industrial Complex 8 (2011) 
[hereinafter CRS KIC]. 
5 See Daniel J. Knudsen & William J. Moon, Recent Development: North Korea and the Poli-
tics of International Trade Law: the Kaesong Industrial Complex and WTO Rules of Origin, 35 
Yale J. Int’l L. 251, 251–55 (2010). 
6 Dukgeun Ahn, Legal Issues for Korea’s “Internal Trade” in the WTO System, in Multilat-
eral and Regional Frameworks for Globalization: WTO and Free Trade Agreements 
362, 363 (Wonhyuk Lim & Ramon Torrent eds., 2005), available at http://www.kdi.re.kr/ 
kdi_eng/database/report_download.jsp?list_no=9916&member_pub=2&type=pub. 
7 See, e.g., Gaesong Industrial Complex Guide, Tong-il-bu [Ministry of Unifica-
tion of the Republic of Korea] 53–54 (2011) ( Jan. 20, 2013), available at http://www. 
korea.go.kr/ptl/search/catsrvc/viewbar.do?srvcId=SERVIC000000000000008620 [hereinaf-
ter GIC Guide]. Most countries treat Kaesong products as North Korean goods unless 
there is a special arrangement between those countries and South Korea. See id. South 
Korea is a member of the WTO while North Korea is not. Members and Observers, World 
Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm 
(last visited Jan. 28, 2014). 
8 See Knudsen & Moon, supra note 5, at 251. 
9 See id.; Eul-chul Lim, Kaesong Industrial Complex 201–02 (2007). 
10 See Knudsen & Moon, supra note 5, at 251; Kim, supra note 2, at 78. 
11 William H. Cooper & Mark E. Manyin, Cong. Research Serv. RL33435, The 
Proposed South-Korea-US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) 25 (2007). 
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are determined to “originate” in South Korea for the purposes of duty-
free treatment under the applicable FTAs.12 Therefore, South Korean 
FTAs confer certain benefits to the Kaesong products that are arguably 
of North Korean origin. The same benefits are not always conferred to 
goods undergoing OP in other countries. 
 Under the MFN principle in Article I:1 of the General Agreement 
of Tariffs and Trade (GATT), any advantage granted by a WTO mem-
ber to a product originating in another country must be made available 
to like products originating in all other WTO members.13 So, any provi-
sion that confers an advantage to one country that is not conferred up-
on all WTO members violates the WTO.14 The WTO, however, does 
allow some exceptions to the MFN principle.15 Among those, Article 
XXIV of the GATT is the exception that would most likely apply to the 
OP provisions in South Korean FTAs.16 It is not clear, however, whether 
an Article XXIV defense can be invoked to legitimize OP provisions.17 
  Thus, the issue is whether South Korea’s FTA partners have vio-
lated the MFN principle of the WTO by applying OP provisions to 
products processed in the KIC, thereby reducing tariffs on Kaesong 
products while not offering similar benefits to the products undergoing 
OP in other countries.18 Although the KIC plays a crucial role in inter-
Korean relations, the problems with origin determination of Kaesong 
products presents a serious challenge to its success.19 
 This article will analyze whether South Korea’s FTA partners have 
violated the MFN principle of the WTO by entering FTAs that include 
discriminatory OP Provisions.20 The next section discusses background 
information about rules of origin (ROOs), inter-Korean trade, and the 
                                                                                                                      
12 See id; Knudsen & Moon, supra note 5, at 252. 
13 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. I:1, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 
187 [hereinafter GATT]. 
14 See id. 
15 See id. art. XXIV. 
16 See id. 
17 See Jose Antonio Rivas, Do Rules of Origin in Free Trade Agreements Comply with Article 
XXIV GATT, in Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System 152–56 (Lo-
rand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds. 2006) (discussing conflicting interpretations of Article 
XXIV). 
18 There are two avenues for review of FTAs. First, the Committee on Regional Trade 
Agreement (CRTA) may assess the compliance of FTAs with Article XXIV of the GATT. 
Second, review might be conducted under the Disputes Settlement Understanding. The 
CRTA has never made a decision that a particular FTA is inconsistent with Article XXIV. 
See Michael Trebilcock et al., The Regulation of International Trade 100 (4th ed. 
2013). Therefore, this paper only discusses the second avenue of review. 
19 See Knudsen & Moon, supra note 5, at 251. 
20 See infra text accompanying notes 111–383. 
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KIC. The third section sets out the requirements for a successful WTO 
Complaint and examines whether the particular OP provisions in ques-
tion amount to a violation of the MFN principle. The fourth section 
determines whether an Article XXIV defense might apply to the South 
Korean OP provisions. The article concludes that the OP provisions in 
South Korean FTAs may amount to a violation of the MFN principle, 
and that there is no Article XXIV defense.21 
I. Background 
A. Rules of Origin 
 ROOs are the rules a country uses to determine which country 
produced each item that it imports, i.e., each item’s “country of ori-
gin.”22 There are two types of ROOs: preferential and non-
preferential.23 Non-preferential ROOs are default standards for deter-
mining whether a good that is being imported from a particular country 
did, in fact, originate in that country.24 If, however, two trading coun-
tries have adopted a preferential tariff arrangement, such as a FTA, then 
the preferential ROOs apply.25 Countries use preferential ROOs for the 
same purpose as non-preferential ROOs: to determine whether a good 
originated in the territory of the preference-receiving country.26 When 
two trading countries are part of a FTA, they will each use the preferen-
tial ROOs contained in the FTA to determine whether a good origi-
nated in the other member-country or not, for the purpose of applying 
the preferential duty rates.27 These same countries will use non-
preferential ROOs to determine the origin of all the goods that are not 
subject to preferential treatment whether or not they are coming from 
the other member-country.28 Interestingly, therefore, a good that is de-
termined not to have originated in a member-country under the prefer-
ential ROOs can still be determined to have originated in that country 
under the non-preferential ROOs. In that situation, the good will still be 
                                                                                                                      
21 See infra Conclusion. 
22 See Trebilcock, supra note 18, at 274–79. 
23 Id. 
24 See id. 
25 See id. A nation can also adopt preferential ROOs unilaterally. See id. One example of 
this is the United States’ Generalized System of Preference (GSP), adopted to promote 
economic development in developing countries. Id. 
26 Id. 
27 See id.; Kim, supra note 2, at 75. 
28 Trebilcock, supra note 18, at 274–79. 
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marked as the product of that country, but will be subject to the regular 
rate of duty. WTO members are allowed to include preferential ROOs in 
their FTAs, as long as the FTAs remove tariffs and other restrictive regu-
lations on “substantially all” trade between the two countries.29 
 The question, then, is whether there is any limit to the amount of 
discretion a country can exercise in designing preferential ROOs.30 
This question remains because there is little international regulation 
on ROOs.31 The Agreement on Rules of Origin (ARO) adopted during 
the Uruguay Round of WTO negotiations contains (1) a harmoniza-
tion plan for non-preferential ROOs, designed to standardize the non-
preferential ROOs of WTO member nations, (2) rules applicable for 
non-preferential ROOs until the harmonization process is completed, 
and (3) “best endeavor” recommendations regarding the procedural 
issues involving preferential ROOs.32 
 In addition to the ARO, there are two notable multilateral conven-
tions related to ROOs: the International Convention on the Simplifica-
tion and Harmonization of Customs Procedures (Kyoto Convention) 
and the Revised Kyoto Convention.33 The Kyoto Convention was 
adopted in 1974.34 The World Customs Organization (WCO) adopted 
a revised version of the Kyoto Convention in 1999.35 The Kyoto Con-
vention and the Revised Kyoto Convention provide standards and rec-
ommended practices for customs administrators in dealing with various 
ROOs.36 While those conventions set out clear standards, they have not 
solved the problem of how to treat ROOs because they lack a strong 
enforcement mechanism.37 Although these conventions are not di-
                                                                                                                      
29 See id. 
30 See Technical Information on Rules of Origin, World Trade Organization (Mar. 1, 
2013, 10:29 PM), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/roi_e/roi_info_e.htm. 
31See id; GATT, supra note 13. 
32 See Agreement on Rules of Origin, 1868 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter ARO]; see also 
Stefano Inama, Rules of Origin in International Trade 23 (2009). 
33 See Kyoto Convention, supra note 3; The Revised Kyoto Convention, World Customs Or-
ganization, http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/facilitation/instrument-and-tools/conven 
tions/pf_revised_kyoto_conv.aspx [hereinafter Revised Kyoto Convention Online]. 
34 See Trebilcock, supra note 18, at 276; see also Kyoto Convention, supra note 3. 
35 See Revised Kyoto Convention Online, supra note 33. 
36 See Kyoto Convention, supra note 3; Revised Kyoto Convention Online, supra note 33; see 
also Revised Kyoto Convention (RKC), Trade Facilitation Implementation Guide (Feb. 
22, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://tfig.unece.org/contents/revised-kyoto-convention.htm [herein-
after RKC]. 
37 RKC, supra note 36. 
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rectly related to WTO law, they set out many important concepts re-
garding ROOs.38 
                                                                                                                     
 The Kyoto Convention and Revised Kyoto Convention contain 
several important concepts that are widely used by customs administra-
tors to determine the origin of goods.39 These are the “wholly obtained 
product” criterion and the “substantial transformation” criterion.40 
Most customs administrators use one of these two criteria, thus an im-
ported good is generally considered to have originated in a country if it 
was wholly obtained from that country (wholly obtained product crite-
rion) or underwent its most recent substantial transformation in that 
country (substantial transformation criterion).41 
 Under the wholly obtained product criterion, a product grown, 
manufactured, or processed entirely within the geographic boundaries 
of one country is considered to have originated in that country.42 Ob-
viously, this criterion cannot be used to determine the origin of a prod-
uct that itself contains materials that were imported from another 
country.43 
 When a good contains materials that originated in more than one 
country, a customs administrator must use the substantial transforma-
tion criterion to determine the origin of the final good. Under the sub-
stantial transformation criterion, the good is considered to have origi-
nated in the country “in which the last substantial manufacturing or 
processing, deemed sufficient to give the commodity its essential char-
acter, has been carried out.”44 There are three criteria for determining 
the existence of substantial transformation: (1) if the good’s tariff clas-
sification has changed (tariff-shift), (2) if there has been a certain 
amount of increase in the ad valorem value (measured as a percentage) 
of the good, or (3) if a certain manufacturing or processing operation 
has been performed on the good.45 
 Under the change of tariff classification criterion, a good is 
deemed to have undergone substantial transformation if the finished 
 
38 See Kyoto Convention, supra note 3, intro., annex D.1.; Revised Kyoto Convention 
supra note 3, specific annex K chp. 2 E3./F1. 
39 See Kyoto Convention supra note 3, at intro., annex D.1. 
40 See Revised Kyoto Convention, supra note 3, specific annex K chp. 2 E3./F1; Kyoto 
Convention, supra note 3, intro., annex D.1. 
41 See Kyoto Convention, supra note 3, intro., annex D.1. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44See Revised Kyoto Convention, supra note 3, specific annex K chp. 2 E3./F1. 
45See Kyoto Convention, supra note 3, secs. A–C, annex D.1. 
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good falls into a tariff classification that is different from the tariff clas-
sifications of all non-originating components and parts used in the 
production of the good.46 The ad valorem percentage criterion is based 
on the amount of value that is added during the manufacturing or pro-
cessing in a country.47 A good is deemed to have originated in a coun-
try if it meets a certain domestic content requirement.48 The manufac-
turing or processing operation criterion requires a good to undergo a 
certain operation, such as a chemical reaction, in a particular country 
to acquire originating status in that country.49 
B. Inter-Korean Trade 
 Before examining the legality of the South Korean OP provisions, it 
is important to note that South Korea currently does not impose a tariff 
on any North Korean products.50 This lack of tariffs on any North Ko-
rean goods is not the result of a FTA between the two Koreas, as none 
exists.51 South Korea likewise does not maintain any Generalized System 
of Preferences for North Korean goods.52 The source of this preferential 
tariff treatment for North Korean goods is Article 3 of South Korea’s 
“Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act” (IKECA).53 Article 3 of 
the IKECA states that “inter-Korean trade is internal trade within a na-
tion and, therefore, shall not be regarded as trade between countries.”54 
The same clause is also found in Article 5 of the South Korean legisla-
tion implementing the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Or-
ganization (Marrakesh Agreement).55 
                                                                                                                      
46Id. sec. A, annex D.1. 
47Id. sec. C, annex D.1. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. sec. B, annex D.1. 
50 Ministry on Unification of the Republic of Korea, Establishing Principled 
Inter-Korean Relations 49 n.2 (2010) [hereinafter Inter-Korean Relations], available 
at http://www.unikorea.go.kr/CmsWeb/tools/board/downAttachFile.req?fileId=FI00000 
99564; see Ahn, supra note 6, at 368. 
51 See WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy Review: Republic of South Korea (Revision), WT/TPR/ 
S/268/Rev.1 (Nov. 8, 2012). 
52 See id. 
53 See Nam-buk-kkyo-ryu-hyeom-nyeo-ge gwan-han beom-nyul [Inter-Korean Exchange 
and Cooperation Act], Act. No. 9846, art 3 (S. Kor.) [hereinafter IKECA]. 
54 See id. 
55 See Se-gye-mu-yeok-kki-gu-hyeop-jjeong-ui i-haeng-e gwan-han teuk-ppyeol-beob [Spe-
cial Law on Implementation of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization], 
art 5, Law of the Republic of Korea, No. 9846, available at http://www.law.go.kr. 
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 Article 26.2 of the IKECA provides that when North Korean goods 
are “brought into” South Korea, regulations regarding tariffs and other 
import fees do not apply.56 Under Article 3 of the IKECA, the provi-
sions in the IKECA take precedence over other laws for matters within 
the scope of the IKECA’s legislative purpose.57 Accordingly, South Ko-
rea tariff law does not apply to products imported from North Korea.58 
 South Korea’s characterization of inter-Korean trade as trade within 
one nation, rather than trade between two countries, is consistent with 
the South Korean Constitution, which defines the territory of South Ko-
rea as “the Korean peninsula and the annexed islands thereto.”59 Addi-
tionally, Article 15 of the 1992 Inter-Korean Basic Agreement that sets 
out the conditions of reconciliation between the two Koreas also states 
that the two Koreas will “cooperate toward the exchange of commodi-
ties as internal exchange within a nation.”60 Therefore, the official posi-
tion of the South Korean government has always been that inter-Korean 
trade is not international trade.61 
 The international community, however, does not consider the two 
Koreas as one nation.62 Therefore, South Korea’s practice of exempt-
ing tariffs on North Korean goods may be found in violation of the 
MFN principle under WTO law.63 In fact, the United States has com-
plained, under the pre-Uruguay Round GATT system, that the duty-
free trade between the two Koreas violates the MFN principle, and sug-
gested that South Korea seek a waiver under GATT Article XXV:5.64 
Understandably, South Korea did not seek such a waiver because it 
could be seen as an implicit recognition that inter-Korean trade is in-
ternational trade, contrary to South Korea’s official position.65 
                                                                                                                      
56 See IKECA, supra note 53, art 26.2. 
57 Id. art 3. 
58 See id. 
59 See Daehanminkuk Hunbeob [Hunbeob] [Constitution] art 3 (S. Kor.). 
60 See Nam-buk-kki-bon-ha-bui-seo [Inter-Korean Basic Agreement], available at http:// 
contents.archives.go.kr/next/content/listSubjectDescription.do?id=007165 (last visited Jan. 
28, 2014). 
61 See Inter-Korean Relations, supra note 50, at 49; Ahn supra note 6, at 362, 368. 
62 For example, the two Koreas are separate members of the United Nations. Member 
States, United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/members/. 
63 See Ahn supra note 6, at 362, 368. 
64 See id at 368. 
65 See William J. Davey, Institutional Framework, in 1 The World Trade Organization: 
Legal, Economic and Political Analysis,  51, 68 (Patrick F. J. Macrory et al. eds., 
2005). 
62 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 37:53 
 There is no doubt that the two Koreas are separate customs terri-
tories.66 A customs territory is an area that possesses “full autonomy in 
the conduct of its external commercial relations.”67 North Korea has 
full autonomy to conduct its external commercial relations.68 Accord-
ingly, other countries treat North Korea as a customs territory, and treat 
goods that originate in North Korea differently than goods that origi-
nate in South Korea.69 
 Contrary to the South Korean Constitution, South Korean FTAs 
define the territory of South Korea as only the territory over which it 
exercises sovereignty.70 For example, the South Korea-United States 
FTA defines the territory of South Korea as “the land, maritime and air 
space over which [South] Korea exercises sovereignty . . . in accordance 
with international and its domestic law.”71 The incorporation of the 
domestic law standard in the definition of South Korean territory is 
potentially problematic because the South Korean Constitution does 
not recognize that North Korea is a separate country.72 Nonetheless, it 
is well understood that South Korea does not exercise sovereignty over 
North Korean territory and, therefore, South Korean FTAs do not cov-
er the northern half of the Korean peninsula.73 
                                                                                                                      
66 See id. 
 67 See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 154, at preamble (1994). Article XII:1 of the Marrakesh Agreement states that any 
“separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commer-
cial relations . . . may accede to” the WTO. Id. (emphasis added). 
68 See Library Cong. Fed. Research Div., Country Profile: North Korea 8–11 
(2007) [hereinafter North Korea Profile], available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ 
profiles/North_Korea.pdf. 
69 See Dukgeun Ahn, Legal and Institutional Issues of Korea-EU FTA: New Model 
for Post NAFTA FTAs? 9, (2010), http://gem.sciences-po.fr/content/publications/pdf/ 
AHN_KOREU%20FTA%20201010.pdf. 
70 Compare Inter-Korean Relations, supra note 50, at 49 (“The ROK Constitution 
states that ‘the territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean peninsula and its 
adjacent islands.’”), with Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-S. Kor., art. 1.4, Mar. 15, 2012, available 
at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-text [here-
inafter KORUS FTA] (“[South Korea defined as] the land, maritime and air space over which 
[South] Korea exercises sovereignty . . . in accordance with international and its domestic 
law.”). 
71 See KORUS FTA, supra note 70, art 1.4. 
72 Daehanminkuk Hunbeob [Hunbeob] [Constitution] art 3 (S. Kor.). 
73 See North Korea Profile, supra note 68, at 811. 
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C. The Kaesong Industrial Complex 
 The KIC was established in 2004 as an economic cooperation pro-
ject between the two Koreas.74 Currently, 123 small to medium-sized 
South Korean companies have established manufacturing plants in the 
KIC.75 They employ North Korean workers to manufacture labor-
intensive goods.76 In 2011, the total production of the KIC was ap-
proximately $400 million.77 
 In the KIC, virtually all inputs other than land and labor are sup-
plied by South Korea.78 All raw materials, components, and parts re-
quired for production of goods are shipped from South Korea.79 All 
facilities required for provision of electricity, energy, and water in the 
KIC have been built and are operated by the South Korean govern-
ment and private parties.80 
 The KIC plays an important role in inter-Korean relations because 
it allows cultural and economic exchange between the two Koreas.81 
According to the South Korean government, one of the purposes of 
the KIC is to provide an opportunity for North Korea to liberalize and 
reform its economy.82 In the KIC, tens of thousands of North Korean 
workers are exposed to outside influences and the market economy.83 
 Despite the strategic importance of the KIC, its expansion has 
been slow because of the problems concerning the origin determina-
tion of Kaesong products.84 Under many countries’ existing ROOs, 
Kaesong products originate in North Korea.85 If these countries con-
                                                                                                                      
74 See Knudsen & Moon, supra note 5, at 252. 
75 See Gae-seong-gong-eop-jji-guji-won-jae-da--KIDMAC [Kaesong Industrial District 
Management Committee–KIDMAC], http://www.kidmac.com (last visited Jan. 28, 2014) 
[hereinafter KIDMAC]. 
76 See CRS KIC, supra note 4, at 8. 
77 See KIDMAC, supra note 75. 
78 See CRS KIC, supra note 4, at 8. 
79 See id. 
80 Id. at 7; see also LIM, supra note 9, at 167–69. 
81 See Inter-Korean Relations, supra note 50, at 42–43; CRS KIC, supra note 4, at 5. 
82 See CRS KIC, supra note 4, at 5. 
83 Id. at summary. 
84 See GIC Guide, supra note 7, at 53–54. Despite the ambitious master plan of Hyundai 
Asan, the original developer of the KIC, the KIC is still at the first phase of development. 
See Gae-seong-gong-dan hyeon-hwang [The Kaesong Industrial Complex Current Status], 
TONG-IL-BU [Ministry of Unification of the Republic of Korea] (Feb. 21, 2013, 10:35 PM), 
http://www.korea.go.kr/ptl/search/catsrvc/viewbar.do?srvcId=SERVIC0000
00000000008620 [hereinafter KIC Current Status]. 
85 See GIC Guide, supra note 7, at 53–54. 
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tinue to treat Kaesong products as originating in North Korea, the 
South Korean companies who process their exports in the KIC will suf-
fer.86 
1. Determination of the Origin of Kaesong Products 
a. Consumption of Kaesong Products in South Korea 
 Products that are processed in the KIC are always imported back to 
South Korea for domestic consumption or exportation to other coun-
tries.87 Because the South Korean government does not consider inter-
Korea trade as international trade, no tariff is imposed on Kaesong 
products when they are “brought into” South Korea.88 Interestingly, 
however, South Korea still applies its country-of-origin marking rules to 
distinguish North Korean goods from South Korean goods.89 
 After establishment of the KIC, South Korea adopted a special rule 
that allows Kaesong products to be marked “Made in Korea” for con-
sumption within South Korea, provided that (1) the South Korean 
share of the equity in the company manufacturing the good is at least 
60 percent; and (b) at least 60 percent  of the materials used in the 
production of the good is of South Korean origin.90 If a Kaesong prod-
uct does not meet these requirements, it must be marked “Made in 
DPRK.”91 
b. Exportation of Kaesong Products 
 Most countries treat products that have undergone OP in the KIC 
as originating in North Korea, absent a special arrangement.92 In other 
words, most countries treat Kaesong products as North Korean prod-
                                                                                                                      
86 Ralph Michael Wrobel, Inter-Korean Cooperation in Special Economic Zones: Developments 
and Perspectives, in Towards a Northeast Asian Security Community 175, 184 (Bern-
hard Seliger & Werner Pascha eds., 2011). 
87 See CRS KIC, supra note 4, at 8. 
88 WTO Secretariat, supra note 51, at 26. 
89 Kim, supra note 2, at 74. 
90 See Nam-buk-kkyo-yeong-mul-pu-mui won-san-ji hwa-gi-ne gwan-han go-si [Notifica-
tion about the Regulation on the Origin of the Goods Traded between South Korea and 
North Korea], Korea Customs Service Notification (Policy Bulletin) No. 2005-6, available at 
http://www.customs.go.kr/kcshome/law/rule/RuleUserList.do?layoutMenuNo=20215&a
dmRul=2. 
91 Id. 
92See GIC Guide, supra note 7, at 53. 
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ucts under their non-preferential ROOs.93 Although it is difficult to 
examine the non-preferential ROOs of each country, it is understand-
able why Kaesong products are generally treated as North Korean 
od
on, or the spe-
fic
at a product originates in if 
e a
country of origin, tariff-shift is, by far, the most frequently used method 
                                                                                                                     
go s.94 
 Under most countries’ non-preferential ROOs, when a product 
undergoes OP, it is classified as “originating” in that country where it 
undergoes OP, unless the OP is limited to a minor operation.95 Recall 
that non-preferential ROOs can determine a good as originating in a 
particular country based on either the “wholly obtained product” crite-
rion or one of the three “substantial transformation” criteria: the tariff-
shift criterion, the ad valorem percentage increase criteri
ci  manufacturing or processing operation criterion.96 
 Under the change of tariff classification criterion for determining 
country of origin, OP only changes a good’s country of origin if its tar-
iff classification changes as a result of the manufacturing process in the 
country where the OP takes place.97 Under the specific manufacturing 
or processing operation criterion for determining country of origin, a 
good originates wherever the designated specific manufacturing or 
processing operation takes place.98 Under the ad valorem percentage 
criterion, a product originates in the country in which a certain 
amount of value is added through manufacturing or processing.99 OP 
is the least likely to change the country th
th d valorem percentage criterion is used.100 
 While any of these methods may be used to determine a good’s 
 
93 See id. 
94 See Revised Kyoto Convention, supra note 3, specific annex K chp. 2 E3/F1. 
95 See id. 
96 See id. It must be noted, however, that the three criteria for the substantial transfor-
mation test are not universal. The United States, for example, determines substantial 
transformation based on a change in name, character, or use of the good. Vivian C. Jones 
& Michael F. Martin, Cong. Research Serv., RL34524, International Trade: Rules 
of Origin 2 (2012) [hereinafter CRS ROOs]. 
97See Kyoto Convention, supra note 3, at sec. A, annex D.1. 
98 Id. at sec. B, annex D.1. 
99 Revised Kyoto Convention supra note 3 specific annex K chp. 2 E3./F1. 
100 Outward processing has the least effect on the country of origin of a good under 
the ad valorem percentage criterion because the criterion is based on the amount of value 
that is added to the good during manufacturing or processing. The value added is often 
calculated by reference to the value of materials and components used in production of 
the good. Therefore, a good will not lose its originating status during OP as long as it 
maintains a certain percentage of originating parts and components. 
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of determining the origin of a good.101 Therefore, most countries are 
likely to classify products undergoing OP in the KIC as North Korean 
goods unless the OP is limited to a minor operation.102 
 Even if there is a FTA between South Korea and the country that 
imports Kaesong products, the other country is likely to treat Kaesong 
products as originating in North Korea, unless the FTA contains a spe-
cial provision (i.e., OP provisions).103 This is because most FTAs—and 
most preferential ROOs in general—contain provisions based on the 
principle of territoriality.104 For example, the FTA between South Ko-
rea and the European Free Trade Association (Korea-EFTA FTA) con-
tains the following provisions: 
                                                                                                                     
 Article 12. Principle of Territoriality 
  1. Except as provided for in Articles 3 and 13, the conditions 
for acquiring originating status set out in Title II must be ful-
filled without interruption in a Party. 
  2. Except as provided for in Article 3, an originating product 
exported from a Party to a non-Party shall when returned be 
considered to be non-originating unless it can be demon-
strated to the satisfaction of the customs authorities in accor-
dance with laws and regulations of the importing Party con-
cerned that: 
   a. the returning product is the same as that exported; 
and 
   b. the returning product has not undergone any op-
eration beyond that necessary to preserve it in good 
condition while being exported.105 
 The principle of territoriality holds that (1) the origin conferring 
process must occur in the territory of a preference-receiving country 
without interruption; and (2) once an originating good is exported for 
additional processing and returns, it loses its originating status.106 Thus, 
 
101 See CRS ROOs, supra note 96, at 5. Today, the change of tariff classification crite-
rion is favored by many countries because: (1) it provides objective and precise methods 
for describing the kind of substantial transformation that confers origin; and (2) most 
countries have adopted the HS as their basis for tariffs. See id. 
102 See id. 
103 See INAMA, supra note 32, at 250. 
104 See id. 
105 See Free Trade Agreement, S. Kor.-Eur. Free Trade Assoc. States, art. 12, Dec. 15, 
2005, http://www.fta.go.kr/new/ftakorea/kor_efta.asp?country_idx=15 (last visited Jan. 
28, 2014) [hereinafter Korea-EFTA FTA]. 
106 See id; Inama, supra note 32, at 250. 
2014] South Korean Outward Processing Provisions and WTO Compliance 67 
under the principle of territoriality, a product undergoing OP loses its 
originating status, since the product has been exported for additional 
processing and then imported.107 Therefore, a FTA that is based on the 
principle of territoriality will not apply the FTA to goods that have un-
dergone OP, including Kaesong products.108 
 In order for South Korea’s FTAs to apply to goods that have un-
dergone OP in the KIC, the South Korean government has included 
OP provisions in many of its recent FTAs.109 Through the OP provisions 
contained in South Korean FTAs, Kaesong products that otherwise 
would have been treated as North Korean goods are treated as South 
Korean goods and receive duty-free treatment.110 
2. Outward Processing Provisions in South Korean Free Trade 
Agreements 
 In recent years, South Korea has entered into ten FTAs, six con-
taining OP provisions and three containing provisions establishing spe-
cial committees to discuss future inclusion of OP provisions.111 One 
FTA was adopted before the planning of the KIC.112 Thus, all of the 
FTAs adopted since the creation of the KIC include either OP provi-
sions or a reference to future OP provisions.113 
 The South Korean OP provisions generally consist of two parts: (1) 
exemptions from the territoriality principle for enumerated products; 
and (2) conditions required for acquiring originating status under the 
ad valorem percentage criterion.114 The second part is crucial because 
                                                                                                                      
107 See Inama, supra note 32, at 250. 
108 See Korea-EFTA FTA, supra note 105, art. 12. 
109 See Cooper & Manyin, supra note 11, at 25. 
110 See id. (“Since the KIC opened, it has been South Korean policy to request that its 
FTA partners allow exports from Kaesong to be considered as ‘Made in Korea’ (meaning 
South Korea), thereby enabling these products to receive the preferential status conferred 
by the FTA.”). 
111 See Korean FTA Status, supra note 1. South Korea has entered into FTAs with the 
United States, the European Union, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Chile, Singapore, India and Peru, Tur-
key, and Colombia. Id. The six FTAs containing OP provisions have been entered with 
ASEAN, Singapore, India, EFTA, Peru, and Colombia. Id. The FTAs with the United States, 
the European Union, and Turkey provide that a special committee be set up for discussing 
the possibility of adopting OP provisions in the future. See id. 
112 See id. The Korea-Chile FTA does not contain OP provisions. See id. 
113 See id. 
114 See Korea-EFTA FTA, supra note 105, art. 13, annex I app. 4. 
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OP provisions do not work well with other criteria for determining sub-
stantial transformation.115 
 The OP provisions in the Korea-EFTA FTA, for example, follow 
this structure.116 Article 13 of the Korea-EFTA FTA provides for an ex-
emption from the principle of territoriality as follows: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 12, the acquisition 
of originating status in accordance with the conditions set out 
in Title II shall not be affected by working or processing car-
ried out outside the territory of a Party on materials exported 
from the Party concerned and subsequently re-imported 
there, provided that the conditions set out in Appendix 4 are 
fulfilled.117 
Article 2 of Appendix 4 sets out the conditions for acquiring originat-
ing status under the above provision: 
Notwithstanding paragraph 1, for products listed in the Table 
set out at the end of this Appendix, the acquisition of origi-
nating status shall not be affected by working or processing 
carried out in an area, for instance an industrial zone, outside 
the territory of a Party, on materials exported from the Party 
concerned and subsequently re-imported to that Party, pro-
vided that: 
 (a) the total value of non-originating input as set out in 
paragraph 5(b) does not exceed 40 percent of the ex-works 
price of the final product for which originating status is 
claimed; and 
 (b) the value of originating materials exported from the 
Party concerned is not less than 60 percent of the total val-
ue.118 
The table at the end of Appendix 4 contains a list of 267 products at 
the HS six-digit level119 that reflects the production of the KIC at the 
                                                                                                                      
 
115 See Norio Komuro, FTA Outward Processing at the Crossroads, 43 J. World Trade 797, 
802 (2009). 
116 See Korea-EFTA FTA, supra note 105, art 13. 
117 See id. 
118 Id. art. 2 app. 4. 
119 Id. The HS six-digit level is the most specific universal classification for traded goods 
under the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS). Harmonized Com-
modity Description and Coding System, United Nations International Trade Statistics Knowledge-
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time the Korea-EFTA FTA was negotiated.120 The Korea-EFTA FTA also 
contains a general exemption from the principle of territoriality for all 
products as long as the total value added during OP does not exceed 10 
percent of the ex-works price of the final product.121 This provision is 
not specific to South Korea and is included in many other FTAs negoti-
ated by the EFTA states.122 
 The FTA between South Korea and Singapore (Korea-Singapore 
FTA) contains an unusual OP provision.123 Singapore has exempted 
the principle of territoriality for 4,625 products at the HS six-digit level, 
provided that those products are “imported into the territory of Singa-
pore from the territory of Korea.”124 There is no substantial transfor-
mation requirement for those products.125 In other words, the only 
condition that is required for those products to acquire originating sta-
tus under the FTA is that they are shipped directly from the territory of 
South Korea.126 It is also “understood” that those 4,625 products in-
clude the goods “produced in the Gaesong Industrial complex and 
other industrial zones on the Korean Peninsula.”127 Furthermore, 
South Korea can add more goods to the list with three months’ notice 
in writing “unless Singapore in good faith indicates otherwise to Ko-
rea.”128 The Korea-Singapore FTA also contains a more “conventional” 
OP provision that exempts 135 enumerated products at the HS ten-
digit level from the territoriality principle, provided that the value add-
ed during OP does not exceed 40 percent of the customs value of the 
finished good.129 So these goods are treated as originating in South Ko-
                                                                                                                      
base http://unstats.un.org/unsd/tradekb/Knowledgebase/Harmonized-Commodity-Descrip 
tion-and-Coding-Systems-HS (last visited Jan. 28, 2014). 
120 See Han EFTA hyeop-jjeong-ui ju-yo-nae-yong [Major Contents of Korea-EFTA FTA], 
at 57, available at http://www.fta.go.kr/new/ftakorea/kor_efta.asp?country_idx=15. 
121 See Korea-EFTA FTA, supra note 105, art. 1 app. 4. 
122 See Komuro, supra note 115, at 810. 
123 See Free Trade Agreement, S. Kor.-Sing., art. 4.3, sec. 1 annex 4B, available at 
http://www.fta.go.kr/new/ftakorea/kor_singapore.asp?country_idx=13 [hereinafter Korea-
Singapore FTA]. 
124 See id; see also GIC Guide, supra note 7, at 54. The reason for this unique provision 
may be that Singapore maintains a zero-tariff policy on almost every import. See Hye-Min 
Bak, Rules of Origin on Outward Processing under FTAs: Implications for Korea, 12(2) Korea 
Rev. of Int. Stud. 70 (2009). 
125 Korea-Singapore FTA, supra note 123, art. 4.3. 
126 See id. 
127 Id. sec. 2, annex 4B. Kaesong is often spelled Gaesong. 
128 Id. 
129 See Korea-Singapore FTA, supra note 123, art. 4.4; see also GIC Guide, supra note 7, 
at 54. 
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rea as long as no more than 40 percent of the customs value of the fin-
ished good was created during OP in the KIC. 
 Other FTAs allow OP for 100 to 108 enumerated products at the 
HS six-digit level, provided that the value added during OP does not 
exceed 40 percent of the value of the product.130 Each FTA provides a 
different method of calculating the value of the good.131 
 Some FTAs explicitly limit the application of the OP provisions to 
operations in the KIC.132 For example, the FTA between South Korea 
and India (Korea-India FTA) limits the application of the OP provisions 
to the “goods which undergo working or processing in an area of 9.9 
Km2 of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex in North Korea.”133 
 Some FTAs treat the manufacturing processes that are performed 
in the KIC as having been performed in South Korea.134 For example, 
Article 1 of Annex 3B of the FTA between South Korea and Peru (Ko-
rea-Peru FTA) states that “operations and processes performed in the 
Gaeseong Industrial Complex located in North Korea, on materials ex-
ported there from Korea and subsequently re-imported to Korea, shall 
be considered to have been performed in the territory of Korea, pro-
vided that the total value of non-originating input does not exceed 40 
percent of the FOB price of the good.” 135 
II. Violation Complaint Under Article XXIII:1(a) 
 While the preferential ROOs established in FTAs between South 
Korea and its trading partners may have deemed certain goods that 
had undergone OP as “originating” in South Korea, these preferential 
ROOs must be consistent with the WTO law.136 Although the WTO has 
not issued any formal decisions on these preferential ROOs, this article 
                                                                                                                      
130 The South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs website provides the text of the ten 
South Korean FTAs. The author examined the text of all those FTAs and compared the 
provisions contained in those agreements that related to outward processing. See Korean 
FTA Status, supra note 1. 
131 Id. 
132 See Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, S. Kor.-India, appendix 3-B-1 
note, available at http://www.fta.go.kr/new/ftakorea/kor_india.asp?country_idx=18 [here-
inafter Korea-India FTA]. 
133 See id. 
134 See Cooper & Manyin, supra note 11, at 25. 
135 See Free Trade Agreement, S. Kor.-Peru, art. 1, annex 3B, available at http://www. 
fta.go.kr/new2/ftakorea/kor_peru.asp?country_idx=28 (Annex 3 is the ninth link from 
the top http://www.fta.go.kr/pds/fta_korea/peru/eng/chapter3_Annex3B.pdf) [herein-
after Korea-Peru FTA]. 
136 See GATT, supra note 13, art. I:1. 
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predicts the outcome of a challenge to the South Korean OP provi-
sions. 
 The MFN principle in Article I:1 of the GATT requires that, with 
respect to customs duties and the methods of levying such duties, any 
advantage, favor, privilege, or immunity granted by a WTO member to a 
product originating in any country should be accorded to the like prod-
ucts originating in all other WTO members.137 Therefore, South Korea’s 
FTA partners may be found in violation of their MFN obligations when 
they exempt or reduce tariffs on Kaesong products under the South 
Korean OP provisions if: (1) exempting or reducing tariffs on Kaesong 
products amounts to advantage, favor, privilege or immunity; (2) Kaesong 
products originate in North Korea; and (3) the “advantage” conferred to 
Kaesong products is not conferred immediately and unconditionally to 
the like products originating in all WTO members.138 If the above re-
quirements are met, the OP provisions in the South Korean FTAs con-
stitute a prima facie violation of WTO law.139 
A. Most-Favored Nation Principle 
1. The OP Provisions Confer an Advantage, Favor, Privilege, or 
Immunity on the Nations to Which They Apply 
 Article I:1 of GATT clearly articulates that the provision encom-
passes duties and other charges levied on goods.140 Therefore, exempt-
ing or reducing tariffs under an FTA is an “advantage, favour, privilege 
or immunity” within the meaning of Article I:1.141 Accordingly, since 
the OP provisions in the South Korean FTAs define products that un-
dergo OP in the KIC as “originating” in South Korea, and thus exempt 
or reduce tariffs on Kaesong products, they provide an “advantage” to 
Kaesong products within the meaning of Article I:1.142 
                                                                                                                      
137 See id. (emphasis added). 
138 See id. 
139 See id. 
140 Id.; see also Trebilcock, supra note 18, at 60. 
141 See GATT, supra note 13, art. I:1; TREBILCOCK, supra note 18, at 60. 
142 See GATT, supra note 13, art. I:1; Korea-EFTA FTA, supra note 105, art. 13; Korea-
Peru FTA, supra note 135, art. 1, annex 3B; Korea-Singapore FTA, supra note 123, art. 4.4. 
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2. Goods Produced in the KIC Originate in North Korea for the 
Purposes of GATT 
 GATT does not clearly define the word “originating” in Article 
I:1.143 Therefore, it is not clear at first whether Kaesong products origi-
nate in North Korea within the meaning of Article I:1. Since the GATT 
does not define the word “originating” clearly, it must be interpreted 
under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vi-
enna Convention). Under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, when 
the ordinary meaning of a term in a treaty does not resolve the ambigu-
ity, “recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, 
including the preparatory work of the treaty and circumstances of its 
conclusion.”144 
 During the second session of the Preparatory Committee in 1947, 
a sub-committee considered the issue of ROOs with respect to MFN 
treatment and determined that “it is within the province of each im-
porting member country to determine in accordance with the provi-
sions of its law for the purpose of applying the most-favoured-nation 
provision, whether goods had in fact originated in a particular coun-
try.”145 Therefore, the ROOs applicable with respect to the word “origi-
nating” in Article I:1 are the non-preferential ROOs of the importing 
country.146 
 The Agreement on Rules of Origin (ARO) of the WTO supports 
the view that goods originate in a particular country when the non-
preferential ROOs of the importing country say so.147 Article 1(1) of 
the ARO limits its scope to “those laws, regulations and administrative 
determinations of general application applied by any [WTO members] 
to determine the country of origin of goods provided such rules of ori-
gin are not related to contractual or autonomous trade regimes leading 
to the granting of tariff preferences going beyond the application of 
paragraph 1 of Article I of GATT 1994.”148 This means that the ARO 
applies to non-preferential ROOs only.149 Article 1(2) of the ARO then 
states that the ROOs referred to in Article 1(1) include “all rules of ori-
                                                                                                                      
143 See GATT, supra note 13, art. I:1. 
144 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
145See Inama, supra note 32, at 2. 
146 See id. 
147 See ARO, supra note 32, art. 1. 
148 See id. art. 1(1). 
149 See id. 
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gin used in non-preferential commercial policy instruments, such as in 
the application of . . . most-favoured-nation treatment under Articles 
I.”150 Therefore, it is clear that non-preferential ROOs are the basis for 
determination of origin under Article I:1.151 
 Most countries treat Kaesong products as North Korean goods un-
der their non-preferential ROOs.152 Therefore, it is possible that many 
of South Korea’s FTA partners treat Kaesong products as North Korean 
goods under their non-preferential ROOs.153 If the same countries that 
treat Kaesong products as originating in North Korea under their non-
preferential ROOs treat Kaesong products as originating in South Ko-
rea under their FTAs, they provide an advantage to the products origi-
nating in North Korea within the meaning of Article I:1.154 
3. The OP Provisions Are Likely Discriminatory under GATT Article 
I:1 
 Article I:1 states that when an “advantage, favour, privilege or im-
munity” is granted by a GATT member to the products originating in 
any country—not just another GATT member—the same benefit should be 
granted to the like products originating in all other GATT members.155 
Therefore, even though North Korea is not a member of the WTO, any 
advantage or benefit conferred by a WTO member to North Korean 
products must be conferred to all other WTO members “immediately 
and unconditionally.”156 
 As discussed above, Kaesong products are products of North Korea 
within the meaning of Article I:1.157 Thus, South Korea’s FTA partners 
must confer the same benefit that they confer to Kaesong products to 
products undergoing OP in other WTO members; or they violate the 
MFN principle of the WTO.158 
 It is evident that the South Korean OP provisions were designed to 
grant preferential tariff treatment to Kaesong products because, inter 
                                                                                                                      
150 Id. art. 1(2). 
151 See id. art 1. 
152See GIC Guide, supra note 7, at 53. 
153 See id. 
154 See ARO, supra note 32, art. 1(1). 
155 See GATT, supra note 13, art. I:1. Although North Korea is not a member of the 
WTO, Article I:1 of the GATT applies with respect to the advantages offered to all coun-
tries, not just WTO members. See also  Komuro, supra note 115, at 843. 
156 Id. 
157 See GIC Guide, supra note 7, at 53. 
158 See GATT, supra note 13, art. I:1. 
74 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 37:53 
alia, the only South Korean FTA that does not address the issue of OP is 
the FTA between South Korea and Chile, which was adopted before the 
planning of the KIC.159 But, the intent behind a provision is not rele-
vant in determining whether a particular measure is discriminatory.160 
 The WTO Appellate Body addressed the issue of whether a provi-
sion violates the MFN requirement of GATT Article I:1 in European 
Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale, and Distribution of Bananas 
(EC-Bananas III). In that case, the Appellate Body rejected using the 
“aims and effects” test in the context of Article I:1.161 The “aims and 
effects” test examined the aims of a measure to determine whether that 
measure provided more favorable treatment to certain exporting coun-
tries, and thus violated the MFN principle of the WTO.162 Since the 
Appellate Body in the EC-Bananas III decision rejected the “aims and 
effects” for determining whether a provision violates the MFN principle 
in Article I:1, a provision can only violate the MFN requirement of Arti-
cle I:1 if the provision creates either de jure or de facto discrimination.163 
 De jure discrimination occurs when a measure explicitly differenti-
ates among products on the basis of their origin.164 Many of the South 
Korean FTAs contains OP provisions that are de jure discriminatory.165 
For example, as noted above, the Korea-Peru FTA explicitly states that, 
in determining the originating status of certain enumerated goods, 
“operations and processes performed in the Gaeseong Industrial Com-
plex located in North Korea . . . shall be considered to have been per-
formed in the territory of [South] Korea.”166 The same treatment is not 
                                                                                                                      
159 See Korean FTA Status, supra note 1. Furthermore, the products covered under the 
OP provisions clearly reflect the production of the KIC. See id. 
160 See Trebilcock, supra note 18, at 78. 
161 See id. It must be noted, however, that there has been an attempt to revive the “aims 
and effects” test. See id. For example, in Canada-Autos, the panel examined the historical 
context of the import duty exemption and noted that “this measure stem[med] from a 
bilateral agreement between Canada and the United States designed to resolve a long-
standing trade dispute between [the two countries] over trade in automotive products.” See 
Panel Report, Canada–Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, WT/DS139/R, 
WT/DS142/R (Feb. 11, 2000), ¶ 10.49 [hereinafter Canada-Autos Panel]. Therefore, in the 
panel’s view, “at the outset the import duty exemption was expected to benefit mainly im-
ports from particular sources.” See id. 
162 See Trebilcock, supra note 18, at 78. 
163 See id. at 76–80. 
164 Id. at 76. 
165 See, e.g., Korea-Peru FTA, supra note 135, art. 1, annex 3-B (providing different 
treatment to product originating in the Gaesong Industrial Complex in North Korea). 
166 See id. 
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provided to goods from other countries.167 The FTA between South 
Korea and Colombia also contains a similar provision.168 
 De jure discrimination can also occur where the application of OP 
provisions is explicitly limited to Kaesong products.169 For example, as 
noted above, the Korea-India FTA limits the application of OP provi-
sions to the “goods which undergo working or processing in an area of 
9.9 Km2 of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex in North Korea.”170 The 
FTA between South Korea and ASEAN also limits the application of the 
OP provisions to the “goods which undergo working and processing in 
the industrial complex located in Gaeseong City and its surrounding 
area.”171 Therefore, imports from other countries cannot benefit from 
the OP provisions contained in those FTAs.172 
 De facto discrimination, on the other hand, occurs when a measure 
treats products originating in certain countries more favorably than 
others.173 De facto discrimination can occur even if the measure does 
not explicitly make distinctions based on the country of origin.174 
Therefore, the South Korean OP provisions may be found in violation 
of Article I:1 if they have discriminatory effects.175 
 In Canada-Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry (Canada-
Autos), the Appellate Body once again addressed whether certain provi-
sions violated the MFN principle in Article I:1.176 Japan and the Euro-
pean Community (EC) challenged a Canadian import duty exemption 
that was subject to certain conditions regarding the importer’s produc-
tion processes, net sales, and value added in Canada.177 Japan and the 
EC argued that, although those conditions are facially origin-neutral, 
they had the effect of limiting the exemption to importers that were 
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United States subsidiaries with large manufacturing operations in 
North America and, therefore, favoring the imports from North Amer-
ica over the imports from Japan and the EC.178 
 The panel in Canada-Autos ruled in favor of the complainants 
holding that facially origin-neutral measures can violate Article I:1 if 
they are de facto discriminatory.179 According to the panel, its view of 
the discriminatory character of the import duty exemption was “based 
on an analysis of the consequences, in the context of an industry charac-
terized by intra-firm trade, of the limitation of the number of eligible 
importers.”180 The Appellate Body approved the panel’s decision with 
respect to de facto discrimination.181 
                                                                                                                     
 The analysis of whether the South Korean OP provisions are de 
facto discriminatory must be conducted on a case-by-case basis, taking 
into account the requirements under the OP provisions in each FTA 
and their effects.182 At least two South Korean FTAs contain OP provi-
sions that are not de jure discriminatory: The Korea-EFTA FTA and the 
Korea-Singapore FTA.183 Nevertheless, all South Korean OP provisions 
are likely to have discriminatory effects for two reasons.184 
 First, in order to qualify for the preferential tariff treatment under 
the OP provisions in a South Korean FTA, the product must be on the 
list of products that are exempt from the principle of territoriality un-
der that FTA.185 Each South Korean FTA has a list of slightly different 
exempt products, but each list includes the major Kaesong products at 
the time the parties negotiated the FTA.186 This makes sense when one 
considers reason why the South Korean government included the OP 
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provisions in their FTAs.187 As noted above, the Korea-Singapore FTA 
even states explicitly that the list of products covered under its OP pro-
visions includes the goods produced in the KIC.188 
 Second, the KIC is the only OPZ that is connected to South Korea 
by land.189 The fact that the KIC is connected to South Korea by land 
gives it a de facto advantage over other OPZs because it is easier for an 
OPZ physically close to the home country to meet the requirements 
under OP provisions.190 For example, to benefit from the OP provi-
sions in the Korea-EFTA FTA, a good that undergoes outward process-
ing must meet the following requirements, among others: (1) the total 
value of non-originating input cannot exceed 40 percent of the ex-
works price of the final product; (2) the value of originating materials 
must be at least 60 percent of the total value of the materials used in 
production of the good; and (3) the finished good must be created by 
processing of the exported materials.191 These requirements are facially 
origin-neutral.192 To satisfy these requirements, however, there must be 
a large volume of transportation of materials and goods between the 
OPZ and the home country.193 Because the KIC is the only OPZ that is 
connected to South Korea by land, OP provisions in the Korea-
Singapore FTA are likely to privilege the South Korean producers hav-
ing OP operations in North Korea (i.e., the KIC) over those producers 
having OP operations in other countries.194 
                                                                                                                     
 In sum, the South Korean OP provisions are likely to be found ei-
ther de jure or de facto discriminatory.195 Accordingly, they are likely to 
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constitute prima facie violations of Article I:1 of the GATT.196 Therefore, 
to avoid liability, South Korea’s FTA partners applying the OP provi-
sions must prove either that their violation did not nullify or impair the 
benefits accruing to the complainant under the GATT, or that the vio-
lation is excused under one of the defenses available under WTO 
law.197 
B. Impairment and Nullification of Benefits 
 Even though a country has committed a prima facie violation of the 
GATT, it still may avoid sanction by proving that the violation has no 
real adverse effect on any member nation.198 Under Article 3.8 of the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding, where there is an infringement of 
the GATT obligations, “the action is considered prima facie to constitute 
a case of nullification or impairment” of the benefits occurring to the 
complainant under the GATT.199 Therefore, the respondent must re-
but the presumption that impairment or nullification has actually oc-
curred.200 
 Nonetheless , “[w]hile the presumption [that a prima facie violation 
of GATT harms a member nation] is in theory rebuttable, in GATT 
practice, it is de facto irrebuttable.”201 In United States-Taxes on Petroleum 
and Certain Imported Substances (US-Taxes on Petroleum), the Panel re-
jected the United States argument that the challenged tax measure did 
not cause impairment or nullification because it had, at most, de mini-
mis trade effects.202 The panel stated that “while [WTO members] had 
not explicitly decided whether the presumption that illegal measures 
cause nullification or impairment could be rebutted, the presumption 
had in practice operated as an irrefutable presumption.”203 
 Furthermore, if the infringement is proved on the basis of the dis-
criminatory effects of the OP provisions, the respondent would not be 
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able to argue that the OP provisions had no effect on trade.204 There-
fore, if the OP provisions are found to be a prima facie violation of Arti-
cle I:1, the respondent would not be able to rebut the presumption of 
impairment and nullification, and the only possible way to avoid a find-
ing that the OP provisions violated the GATT would be to raise an af-
firmative defense.205 
C. Defenses to the Article I:1 Violation Claim 
 The MFN principle in Article I:1 is subject to a number of excep-
tions, which serve as defenses in the case that a GATT member nation 
has committed a prima facie violation of the GATT.206 Among those ex-
ceptions, Article XXIV is likely to be the most effective defense against 
the complaint that the OP provisions in the South Korean FTAs violate 
the MFN principle of the WTO.207 
III. Article XXIV Defense 
 Article XXIV:5 of the GATT allows free trade areas among GATT 
member and non-member countries, as long as the countries meet cer-
tain requirements.208 If the OP provisions in the South Korean FTAs 
are an essential part of the agreements establishing GATT-compliant 
free-trade areas, then the Article XXIV defense allows them to exist 
within the WTO.209 
                                                                                                                     
 The OP provisions that apply to products made in the KIC repre-
sent derogation from the principle of territoriality.210 Moreover, the OP 
provisions create preferential ROOs that are “broader” and “more in-
clusive” than the non-preferential ROOs because they confer the bene-
fit of the FTAs to the imports that would not have been considered to 
be originating in the FTA partners under the non-preferential 
ROOs.211 Although there is a basis to argue that Article XXIV provides 
a defense for preferential ROOs that are “more restrictive” than the 
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non-preferential ROOs, it is not clear whether the same is true for 
preferential ROOs that are “more inclusive” than the non-preferential 
ROOs.212 Currently, there is no WTO jurisprudence explaining what 
the Article XXIV requirements are with respect to preferential 
ROOs.213 The analysis contained in this article, however, proves that the 
Article XXIV defense is not available for the South Korean OP provi-
sions and the preferential ROOs created under those OP provisions.214 
                                                                                                                     
A. Language of Article XXIV 
 Article XXIV contains two types of language: purposive and opera-
tive.215 The purposive language describes the purpose of the Article 
XXIV defenses—the provisions whereby a country that has violated the 
MFN principle can nonetheless avoid sanction.216 Article XXIV:4 rec-
ognizes “the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the devel-
opment, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between 
the economies of the countries parties to such agreements.”217 This 
same section identifies two purposes of free-trade areas: (1) to facilitate 
trade between the constituent territories; and (2) not to raise barriers 
to the trade of other WTO members.218 The purposive language in Ar-
ticle XXIV:4 is supplemented by the preamble of the Understanding 
on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 (Understand-
ing on Article XXIV), which “reaffirms” that, in the formation or free-
trade areas, the contracting parties “should to the greatest possible ex-
tent avoid creating adverse effects on the trade of other [WTO] 
[m]embers.”219 
 The operative language of Article XXIV imposes two types of re-
quirements for a GATT-compliant free-trade area: external and inter-
nal.220 The external requirement refers to the requirements of the FTA 
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in relation to countries that are not parties to the FTA.221 Article 
XXIV:5(b) articulates the external requirement—the provisions of the 
GATT shall not prevent the formation of a free-trade area provided that: 
the duties and other regulations of commerce maintained in 
each of the constituent territories and applicable at the for-
mation of such free-trade area . . . to the trade of contracting 
parties not included in such area . . . shall not be higher or 
more restrictive than the corresponding duties and other reg-
ulations of commerce existing in the same constituent territo-
ries prior to the formation of the free-trade area.222 
In other words, the external requirement says that the FTA cannot 
make trade between FTA member-nations and non-member nations 
more restrictive than it was before the FTA.223 
 The internal requirement refers to the obligations of the FTA par-
ties with respect to the trade among themselves.224 Article XXIV:8(b) 
sets out the internal requirement by defining a free-trade area as “a 
group of two or more customs territories in which the duties and other 
restrictive regulations of commerce . . . are eliminated on substantially 
all the trade between the constituent territories in products originating 
in such territories.”225 This article will examine the external and inter-
nal requirements of Article XXIV’s operative language in depth in the 
following section. 
 In Turkey-Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products (Tur-
key-Textiles), the Appellate Body articulated a two-pronged test for invok-
ing an Article XXIV defense with respect to a customs union.226 This 
test is also applicable to measures adopted under FTAs.227 Therefore, 
this article applies the same test modified for application with respect 
to FTAs as follows: 
 1.The party claiming the benefit of an Article XXIV defense 
must demonstrate that the measure at issue is introduced up-
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on the formation of a free-trade area that fully satisfies the ex-
ternal and internal requirements under Article XXIV. 
 2. That party must demonstrate that the formation of that 
free-trade area would be prevented if it were not allowed to 
introduce the measure at issue.228 
 If the above test is met, the South Korean OP provisions can 
be justified as an essential part of GATT-compliant FTAs, and 
therefore South Korea’s FTA partners will not be able to be 
sanctioned for the prima facie GATT violation in their FTAs.229 
B. The Formation of a Free Trade Area Prong of the Turkey-Textiles Test 
1. The External Requirement for a GATT-Compliant FTA 
 Under Article XXIV:5(b), a FTA party’s duties and other regulations 
of commerce (ORCs) on goods traded with countries outside the free-
trade area cannot be more restrictive than the duties and ORCs that 
the same country placed on the goods traded with the countries out-
side the free-trade area before the free-trade area was formed.230 Basi-
cally, the FTA cannot increase duties or ORCs on goods traded with 
countries that are not in the free-trade area.231 To determine whether 
the South Korean FTAs containing OP provisions satisfy this require-
ment, one must answer the following two questions: (1) whether ROOs 
are ORCs; and (2) whether the external requirement is applicable to 
preferential ROOs, because if it is, OP provisions cannot be used to 
create preferential ROOs that fail to meet the external requirement. 
a. Other Regulations of Commerce and Rules of Origin 
 There is strong support for the view that ORCs include ROOs.232 
The panel in Turkey-Textiles considered the meaning of ORCs and con-
cluded that “the ordinary meaning of the terms ‘other regulations of 
commerce’ could be understood to include any regulation having an 
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impact on trade.”233 If this broad interpretation of ORCs is accepted, 
ORCs include ROOs.234 
 The language of Article XXIV also supports the view that ORCs 
include ROOs.235 A close reading of Article XXIV shows that the phrase 
“other regulations of commerce” is always used in conjunction with the 
expression “trade” and that the phrase, “trade in products originating,” 
is always used in conjunction with the phrase, “other restrictive regula-
tions of commerce.”236 If ORCs include ROOs, then the phrase “other 
regulation of commerce” should not be used together with “trade in 
products originating,” because using them together creates confu-
sion.237 
 For example, Article XXIV:5(b) requires that the duties and ORCs 
imposed by the FTA on the trade of third-party countries cannot be 
more restrictive than the pre-FTA duties and ORCs had been.238 If the 
word “trade” were replaced by the phrase “trade in products originat-
ing,” then Article XXIV:5(b) would have a very different meaning. If 
this were the case, the article would require that the duties and ORCs 
created by the FTA that are applicable to the trade of products originating 
in third-party countries cannot be more restrictive than the pre-FTA 
duties and ORCs had been.239 If ORCs include ROOs, the new article 
would provide that the post-FTA ROOs that are applicable to the trade 
of products originating in the third-party countries cannot be more re-
strictive than the pre-FTA ROOs had been.240 
 To apply this standard, one must understand the meaning of 
“products originating in the third-party countries.” In order to under-
stand the meaning of this phrase, one must know what ROOs deter-
mine “products originating in the third-party countries.” Hence, the 
meaning of this new article would be extremely confusing because of 
the word “originating.”241 Therefore, if ORCs include ROOs, the 
phrase “other regulation of commerce” must only be used together 
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with “trade” instead of “trade in products originating,” in order to avoid 
confusion.242 Accordingly, the fact that the drafters of the GATT distin-
guished between “trade” and “trade in products originating,” but chose 
not to use the latter expression with respect to “other regulations of 
commerce,” supports the view that ORCs include ROOs.243 
 Further support for the proposition that ROOs are “other regula-
tions of commerce” is the fact that the definition of a “customs union” 
in Article XXIV:8(a) makes more sense if ORCs include ROOs.244 Arti-
cle XXIV:8(a) defines a customs union as: 
the substitution of a single customs territory for two or more 
customs territories, so that (i) duties and other restrictive regu-
lations of commerce . . . are eliminated with respect to substan-
tially all the trade between the constituent territories of the un-
ion or at least with respect to substantially all the trade in 
products originating in such territories, and, (ii) . . . substantially 
the same duties and other regulations of commerce are applied by 
each of the members of the union to the trade of territories 
not included in the union.”245 
The language of Article XXIV:8(a)(i) clearly favors customs unions 
without internal border controls. In other words, there is preference 
for free trade within a customs union over free trade in products originating 
in the territories of the customs union. A customs union without inter-
nal border controls cannot be formed unless each member of the cus-
toms union adopts substantially the same ROOs with respect to its trade 
with third-party countries.246 When the ROOs are not uniform among 
members of a customs union, trade deflection occurs.247 
 Trade deflection refers to the situation in which goods are first ex-
ported to a low-tariff member of a customs union and then exported to 
a high-tariff member for ultimate sales there.248 If ORCs include ROOs, 
Article XXIV:8(a)(ii) would require each member of a customs union 
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to adopt substantially the same ROOs with respect to its trade with 
third-party countries.249 Such a requirement is reasonable given the 
preference for customs unions without internal border controls under 
Article XXIV:8(a)(i) and the problem of trade deflection associated 
with formation of customs unions. 
 Some may argue that, because union members with internal bor-
der controls are allowed under Article XXIV:8(a)(i), interpreting Arti-
cle XXIV:8(a)(ii) to require each customs union member to adopt sub-
stantially the same ROOs is inconsistent with Article XXIV:8(a)(i).250 
“[S]ubstantially the same,” however, is not equal to the “same.” Hence, 
unless each customs union member adopts exactly identical ROOs, 
some internal border controls are inevitable. This may be the reason 
for the flexible requirement in Article XXIV:8(a)(i).251 
 Therefore, the phrase “other regulations of commerce” in Article 
XXIV:8(a) must be interpreted to include ROOs.252 If the phrase “oth-
er regulations of commerce” is used consistently throughout Article 
XXIV, the phrase contained in the provisions dealing with FTAs must 
also be interpreted to include ROOs. For the foregoing reasons, ORCs 
in Article XXIV:5(b) include ROOs. 
b. Preferential Rules of Origin 
 The fact that ORCs include ROOs does not necessarily mean that 
Article XXIV:5(b) imposes an external requirement with respect to 
preferential ROOs.253 It is clear from the wording of Article XXIV:5(b) 
that the external requirement only applies to the duties and ORCs that 
are applicable to the trade of the WTO members not included in the 
free-trade area.254 Therefore, Article XXIV:5 only applies to preferen-
tial ROOs if preferential ROOs are “ORCs applicable to the trade of 
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third-party countries.”255 The answers to this question depend on the 
meaning of the word “applicable.”256 
i. The “Broad” Interpretation of “Applicable” in Article XXIV:5 
 The Oxford English Dictionary gives the ordinary meaning of the 
word “applicable” and defines it as “relevant or appropriate.”257 It de-
fines “relevant” as “closely connected or appropriate to the matter at 
hand,” and defines “appropriate” as “suitable or proper in the circum-
stances.”258 Between the two words, “relevant” describes the meaning of 
“applicable” more accurately in this context. Using this ordinary mean-
ing of “applicable,” Article XXIV:5(b) imposes an external require-
ment on the duties and ORCs that are relevant or closely connected to the 
trade of third-party countries. Therefore, preferential ROOs are ORCs 
applicable to the trade of third-party countries, as long as the ROOs 
have some impact on such trade.259 
 The purposive language in the preamble of the Understanding on 
Article XXIV also supports the view that preferential ROOs are ORCs 
applicable to the trade of third-party countries.260 Article XXIV states 
that the countries forming a free-trade area “should to the greatest possible 
extent avoid creating adverse effects on the trade of other [WTO] 
[m]embers.”261 
 Under, Article XXIV:5(b), “the duties and other regulations of com-
merce maintained in each of [the FTA parties] and applicable at the 
formation of [a] free-trade area . . . to the trade of [other WTO mem-
bers] . . . shall not be higher or more restrictive than the corresponding du-
ties and other regulations of commerce existing . . . prior to the forma-
tion of the free-trade area.”262 Therefore, if ORCs include preferential 
ROOs, a FTA cannot include preferential ROOs that are more restric-
tive than are the preferential ROOs that existed before.263 
 Article XXIV:5(b), however, does not impose any requirements on 
the preferential ROOs included in a newly adopted FTA because no 
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256 See id.; Rizwanul Islam, Economic Integration in South Asia: Charting a Le-
gal Roadmap 49–51 (2012); Rivas, supra note 17, at 152–54. 
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corresponding regulations—i.e., preferential ROOs—existed previ-
ously.264 Preferential ROOs refer to the special set of ROOs that are 
adopted under an FTA, in addition to the existing non-preferential 
ROOs, to determine whether a particular good traded between the 
FTA parties is subject to the benefit of the FTA.265 In other words, pref-
erential ROOs do not replace non-preferential ROOs and adoption of 
an FTA does not affect non-preferential ROOs at all.266 
 For example, even if a television shipped from South Korea to the 
United States does not “originate” in South Korea under the preferen-
tial ROOs contained in the KORUS FTA, it still may originate in South 
Korea under the non-preferential ROOs of the United States.267 But, if 
the television qualified under the non-preferential ROOs, then it would 
not be eligible for duty-free treatment.268 The point is that preferential 
ROOs and non-preferential ROOs are two separate measures.269There-
fore, the restrictiveness of the preferential ROOs contained in a newly 
adopted FTA cannot be compared with the restrictiveness of the non-
preferential ROOs under Article XXIV:5(b), because the non-
preferential ROOs are not the “corresponding” regulations of com-
merce that existed before the adoption of the FTA.270 
 There are only “corresponding” regulations of commerce for pref-
erential ROOs when an FTA is replaced by another FTA with new sets 
of preferential ROOs.271 For example, the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) replaced the FTA between Canada and the Unit-
ed States (CUS FTA).272 In this case, Article XXIV:5(b), using the 
broad definition of “applicable,” would require that the preferential 
ROOs contained in NAFTA not be more restrictive than are the prefer-
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ential ROOs contained in the CUS FTA with respect to the trade of 
third-party countrie 273s.  
                                                                                                                     
 Currently, there is no South Korean FTA that has replaced an ex-
isting FTA.274 Therefore, under the broad definition of “applicable,” 
the OP provisions contained in the South Korean FTAs would not be 
subject to the external requirement under Article XXIV:5(b).275 
ii. The “Narrow” Interpretation of “Applicable” in Article XXIV:5 
 Under a narrower interpretation of “applicable” based on the or-
dinary meaning of the word, preferential ROOs are not ORCs applica-
ble to the trade of third-party countries.276 The Merriam-Webster Diction-
ary defines “applicable” as “capable of or suitable for being applied.”277 
If this narrow meaning is accepted, the phrase “ORCs applicable to the 
trade of third-party countries” can be interpreted to mean “ORCs that 
are capable of being applied to the trade of third-party countries.”278 
 Under this narrow interpretation, preferential ROOs do not con-
stitute “ORCs applicable to the trade of third-party countries,” because 
they cannot be applied to the trade of third-party countries.279 In other 
words, the preferential ROOs under a FTA only apply to the trade be-
 
273 See id. For example, before NAFTA was adopted and its predecessor the Canada-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement was in place, tomato ketchup made in the United States or 
Canada from tomato paste imported from a third country such as Chile was considered of 
CUS FTA origin and received duty-free treatment. See id. The preferential ROOs contained 
in NAFTA, however, did not recognize ketchup made of tomato paste imported from a 
third country as a NAFTA product. See id. Therefore, Chile, which used to be a leading 
exporter of tomato paste to the United States, was overtaken by Mexico after adoption of 
the NAFTA. See id. (arguing that, since the NAFTA ROO on ketchup was more restrictive 
to the trade of Chile than the “corresponding measure” that existed before the formation 
of the NAFTA the NAFTA provision violated the external requirement under Article XXIV 
of the GATT). 
274 See FTA Trend in Korea, Kor. Custom Serv. (Sept. 2012), http://www.customs.go. 
kr/kcshome/main/content/ContentView.do?contentId=CONTENT_ID_000002320&layo
utMenuNo=23225. Korea has a bilateral FTA with Singapore, and Singapore is also party 
to the Korea-ASEAN FTA. See id. The Korea-Singapore FTA and the Korea-ASEAN FTA are 
simultaneously in effect. See id. 
275 See Kim & Kim, supra note 253, at 635–37; Rivas, supra note 17, at 151. 
276 See Kim & Kim, supra note 253, at 635–37; Rivas, supra note 17, at 151; infra notes 
291–294 and accompanying text. 
277 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 97 (Frederick C. Mish et al. eds., 
1991). 
278 See id.; Andrew D. Mitchell & Nicolas J.S. Lockhart, Ensuring Compliance Between a Bi-
lateral PTA and the WTO, in Negotiating a Preferential Trade Agreement: Issues, 
Constraints and Practical Options 235, 247–48 (Sisira Jayasuriya et al. eds., 2009). 
279 See Rivas, supra note 17, at 152–53. 
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tween the contracting parties and not to the trade of third-party coun-
tries.280 Therefore, under the narrow interpretation, Article XXIV:5(b) 
does not impose any external requirement with respect to preferential 
ROOs.281 
 Thus, under either the broad or narrow definition of “applicable,” 
the OP provisions in the South Korean FTAs do not prevent the FTAs 
from meeting the external requirement of Article XXIV:5(b).282 
2. The Internal Requirement for a GATT-compliant FTA 
 In order to successfully invoke an Article XXIV defense, the FTA 
must meet the internal requirement by eliminating substantially all re-
strictions on commerce between its member countries.283 Under Arti-
cle XXIV:8(b), a free-trade area is defined as “a group of two or more 
customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of 
commerce . . . are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the con-
stituent territories in products originating in such territories.”284 If a 
free-trade area does not meet this internal requirement, an Article 
XXIV defense is unavailable.285 
                                                                                                                     
 Proponents of OP provisions may argue that OP provisions sub-
stantially eliminate the “other restrictive regulations of commerce” 
(ORRCs) between FTA member countries, and thus satisfy the internal 
requirement of Article XXIV:8(b).286 A close examination of the fol-
lowing terms in Article XXIV:8(b), however, shows that OP provisions 
cannot be justified as a measure to meet the internal requirement: (a) 
“other restrictive regulation or commerce”; (b) “originating”; (c) “sub-
stantial”; and (d) “eliminated.”287 
a. Other Restrictive Regulations of Commerce 
 As explained above, ORCs include ROOs.288 Because the only dif-
ference between ORCs and ORRCs is the modifier “restrictive,” ORRCs 
 
280 See id. 
281 See id.; Kim & Kim, supra note 253, at 634–35. 
282 See Korea-EFTA FTA, supra note 105, art. 2 annex 1, art. 13 annex 1 app. 4; GATT, 
supra note 13, art. XXIV:5. 
283 See GATT, supra note 13, art XXIV:8(b). 
284 Id. (emphasis added). 
285 See Kim & Kim, supra note 253, at 615. 
286 See GATT, supra note 13, art. XXIV:8(b); Trebilcock, supra note 18, at 103–04. 
287 See GATT, supra note 13, art. XXIV:8(b). 
288 See supra Part III(B)(1)(a). 
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are a subset of ORCs that have restrictive effects.289 Therefore, ORRCs 
include restrictive ROOs.290 
 Some may argue that the word “restrictive” refers to the nature or 
classification of a particular type of regulation.291 For example, while 
customs duties are always restrictive to trade, ROOs are neutral unless 
they are designed to be restrictive.292 Therefore, under this “classifica-
tion” approach—whereby an item is a member of the class only if it 
would always fit the class—ORRCs do not include ROOs.293 
 But, the way that the word “restrictive” is used in other parts of Ar-
ticle XXIV suggests that it should be defined under the “effect” ap-
proach.294 Article XXIV:5(a) and (b) state that ORCs adopted after the 
formation of a customs union or a free-trade area cannot be more re-
strictive than the previous ORCs.295 Article 2 of the Understanding on 
Article XXIV endorses the “effect” test in assessing the “restrictiveness” 
under Article XXIV:5(a) and (b).296 Article 2 recognizes that “for the 
purpose of the overall assessment of the incidence of other regulations 
of commerce for which quantification and aggregation are difficult, the 
examination of individual measures, regulations, products covered and 
trade flows affected may be required.”297 Thus, under the more-
appropriate “effects” approach to defining “restrictive,” ORRCs include 
ROOs that have restrictive effects on trade.298 
 Under Article XXIV:8(b), a GATT-compliant free-trade area is “a 
group of two or more customs territories in which the duties and other 
restrictive regulations of commerce . . . are eliminated on substantially 
all the trade between the constituent territories in products originating 
in such territories.”299 Therefore, Article XXIV:8(b) requires substan-
tial elimination of trade barriers that are specific to the trade within the 
free-trade area.300 Non-preferential ROOs, however, are not country-
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specific.301 In other words, an FTA does not modify non-preferential 
ROOs. Therefore, ORRCs in Article XXIV:8(b) can only include re-
strictive preferential ROOs, which are country-specific. 
b. The Meaning of “Originating” in Article XXIV 
 Article XXIV:8(b) requires a nation entering into a FTA to elimi-
nate duties and ORRCs on substantially all the trade on the goods origi-
nating in the members of the FTA.302 Therefore, in order for the South 
Korean OP provisions to be justified on the basis of Article XXIV:8(b), 
they must help eliminate the trade on the goods originating in the FTA 
territories.303 
 As seen in Article XXIV:8(a)(i), the expression “trade” applies to a 
different set of goods than the expression “trade in products originat-
ing.”304 The former refers to the state of “free circulation” —the com-
mercial exchange between two territories without any border controls— 
whereas the latter refers to the commercial exchange under some appli-
cable ROOs.305 It is not clear, however, which ROOs are applicable with 
respect to the word “originating” in Article XXIV.306 There are two pos-
sible interpretations of “originating” in Article XXVI:8(b). 
 First, “originating” could be interpreted to mean “originating un-
der the non-preferential rules of origin that would have applied other-
wise.”307 As discussed earlier, there is strong evidence supporting the 
view that in determining the origin of goods for the purposes of apply-
ing GATT Article I:1, one should examine a country’s non-preferential 
ROOs.308 According to J. B. Kim and J. Kim, “originating” in Article 
XXIV should also define the origin of a good under a country’s non-
preferential ROOs because the “trade” subject to the MFN treatment 
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under Article I:1 is the same “trade” in the context of “substantially all 
the trade” under Article XXIV.309 
 Article XXIV:8(b) requires that, under a GATT-compliant FTA, 
duties and ORRCs are “eliminated on substantially all the trade be-
tween the constituent territories in products originating in such territo-
ries.”310 If non-preferential ROOs are used to determine the scope of 
“trade between the constituent territories in products originating in 
such territories,” duties and ORRCs, including restrictive ROOs, must 
be eliminated on substantially all the trade in products that would orig-
inate—as determined by the non-preferential ROOs—in the territories 
of the FTA parties.311 Therefore, preferential ROOs cannot be substan-
tially more restrictive than non-preferential ROOs can be with respect 
to the same country.312 
 Alternatively, one could use a hypothetical set of “neutral ROOs” 
to determine the origin of goods, rather than non-preferential ROOs. 
For a FTA to be GATT-compliant, it must eliminate restrictive preferen-
tial ROOs on substantially all the trade in the products originating in the 
territories of the free-trade area.313 If the ROOs that determine the 
meaning of “originating” are already restrictive, then the elimination of 
restrictive preferential ROOs will not lead to substantial trade liberaliza-
tion. Therefore, the ROOs that determine the meaning of “originat-
ing” must be nonrestrictive. 
 Different countries’ non-preferential ROOs, however, are not 
equally nonrestrictive. Article 2(c) of the ARO states that “rules of origin 
shall not themselves create restrictive, distorting, or disruptive effects on 
international trade.”314 But, the ARO does not specify how ROOs 
should be applied by each individual country.315 That task was left to the 
harmonization committee.316 Therefore, until the harmonization proc-
ess is completed, each country applies different non-preferential 
ROOs.317 This means that the non-preferential ROOs in some countries 
are either more or less restrictive than are those in other countries.318 
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Accordingly, if non-preferential ROOs are used to determine the origin 
of a good under Article XXIV:8(b), Article XXIV:8(b) would impose 
different internal requirements for each country. 
                                                                                                                     
 Using neutral ROOs would solve this problem. Neutral ROOs are 
analogous to a zero customs duty. When a customs duty is eliminated, it 
leads to a zero rate of duty. Similarly, elimination of restrictive ROOs 
should lead to neutral ROOs. 
 The preamble of the ARO sets out some of the requirements for 
an ROO to be neutral, including: (1) “rules of origin themselves do not 
create unnecessary obstacles to trade;” (2) “rules of origin do not nul-
lify or impair the rights of [GATT members] under GATT 1994;” and 
(3) “rules of origin are prepared and applied in an impartial, transpar-
ent, predictable, consistent and neutral manner.”319 While these re-
quirements determine which ROOs are neutral by definition, they do 
not describe neutral ROOs in practice.320 
 In practice, neutral ROOs are likely to be defined by a consensus 
of WTO member nations.321 This consensus is set out in the working 
draft of the Harmonized Rules of Origin, in which the ARO set out a 
work program for the harmonization of non-preferential ROOs.322 Al-
though the harmonization process is not completed, significant pro-
gress has been made.323 If the members of WTO adhere to the norms 
in the preamble of the ARO when creating the Harmonized Rules of 
Origin, the result of such negotiation will constitute the international 
consensus on neutral ROOs.324 
 
319 Id. pmbl. 
320 See id. Part IV. 
321 See id. 
322 Id. 
323 See CRS ROOs, supra note 96, at 4; Committee on Rules of Origin, Draft Consolidated 
Text of Non-Preferential Rules of Origin, G/RO/W/111/Rev.6, (Nov. 11, 2010) [hereinafter 
CRO Draft]. As of March 2010, the Committee on Rules of Origin (CRO) reported that a 
consensus had been reached on country-of-origin rules for 1,528 products, which meant 
that approximately 55 percent of the work of the committee had been accomplished. The 
last draft consolidated text of non-preferential rules of origin was issued in November 
2010. Id.; CRS ROOs, supra note 96, at 4. 
324 See ARO, supra note 32, pmbl. The harmonized ROOs, however, may only be repre-
senting the result of the best-effort negotiation between the WTO members. See Trebil-
cock, supra note 18, at 361. There is a fixed quotient of protectionism in the world. See id. 
If protectionism is suppressed in some dimensions, it will resurface in others. See id. There-
fore, it might be possible that the harmonized ROOS are not totally free from such protec-
tionist pressure. See id. 
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c. The Meaning of “Substantial” in Article XXIV:8 
 In order to qualify for the Article XXIV defense, a free trade 
agreement must eliminate other restrictive regulations on “substan-
tially” all goods traded between FTA member nations.325 The next re-
quirement this article examines is what “substantial” means within the 
context of Article XXIV’s wording of “substantially all trade.” The Ap-
pellate Body in Turkey-Textiles discussed the meaning of “substantial” 
with respect to Article XXIV:8(a)(i), which deals with customs un-
ions.326 Because the word “substantial” is used throughout Article XXIV 
in a consistent manner, the Appellate Body’s interpretation of “substan-
tial” in Turkey-Textiles can also be used to interpret the meaning of “sub-
stantial” in Article XXIV:8(b), which deals with free-trade areas.327 
 In Turkey-Textiles, the Appellate Body decided, “[i]t is clear . . . that 
‘substantially all the trade’ is not the same as all the trade, and also that 
‘substantially all the trade’ is something considerably more than merely 
some of the trade.”328 Thus, “substantially all the trade” is more than 
some, but less than all, trade.329 The Appellate Body also affirmed the 
Panel’s opinion that “[t]he ordinary meaning of the term ‘substan-
tially’ in the context of subparagraph 8(a) [of Article XXIV] appears to 
provide for both qualitative and quantitative components.”330 
 From a quantitative standpoint, various commentators have pro-
posed different percentages ranging from 51 percent to 99 percent in 
order to determine what “substantially all” the trade means. 331 Al-
though these disparate estimations abound, the broadest consensus is 
that “substantially all” means between 80 and 90 percent of a whole.332 
But, one scholar has noted that many developing countries have re-
sisted this interpretation, arguing that even 80 percent liberalization is 
too high a number to define “substantially all,” since if they were to lib-
eralize 80 percent of their trade, they would be deprived of the “policy 
space” required to attain development objectives.333 
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 Many GATT member nations have resisted placing a quantifiable 
limit on how much of their trade can be covered by FTAs that are not 
governed by the GATT, and instead focus on a qualitative definition.334 
Yet, the meaning of the qualitative component of the definition of 
“substantially all” is even more complicated than the quantitative com-
ponent.335 When the Stockholm Convention establishing the European 
Free Trade Association was examined for compliance with the GATT in 
1960, the Working Parties agreed that “substantially all the trade” 
means that “no important segment of trade can be omitted from an 
agreement.”336 Likewise, the preamble of the Understanding on Article 
XXIV recognizes that the positive contribution of customs unions and 
free-trade areas to the expansion of world trade is “diminished if any 
major sector of trade is excluded.”337 Thus, the preamble of the Under-
standing on Article XXIV says that “substantially all” trade must include 
“all major sector[s]” of trade, regardless of the overall percentage of 
trade included.338 
 Because the definition of “substantially all” includes both quantita-
tive and qualitative aspects, the restrictiveness of ROOs cannot be ag-
gregated into a single number.339 Rather, the restrictiveness of prefer-
ential ROOs must be assessed in light of their effects on the trade of 
each individual product because different ROOs apply to different 
products.340 
                                                                                                                     
 Turning to the South Korean OP provisions in question, one can 
see that they are not an effort to eliminate restrictive preferential ROOs 
on substantially all the trade in the products originating in the territory 
of South Korea and its FTA partners for two reasons.341 
 First, Kaesong products might not be products originating in South 
Korea within the meaning of Article XXIV:8(b).342 If the ROOs that 
define “originating” are non-preferential ROOs, Kaesong products are 
unlikely to originate in South Korea.343 Under neutral ROOs, Kaesong 
 
334 See id.; Kim & Kim, supra note 253, at 617–21. 
335 See Trebilcock, supra note 18, at 105. 
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products may originate in South Korea.344 However, one cannot deter-
mine how Kaesong products should be treated under neutral ROOs 
without comparing each product’s production process with the ROO 
for that particular product as set out by the working draft of the Har-
monized Rules of Origin.345 
 Second, even if Kaesong products originate in South Korea within 
the meaning of Article XXIV:8(b), Kaesong products are not a signifi-
cant part of South Korean trade, either quantitatively or qualitatively.346 
For example, Kaesong products represented only about 0.0086 percent 
of the total exports from South Korea in 2010, an extremely small por-
tion of South Korean trade.347 Furthermore, Kaesong products, by 
themselves, cannot be considered a “sector” of trade, because they con-
sist of several hundreds of diverse products.348 
 Therefore, neither the quantitative nor the qualitative require-
ment of the substantiality test requires elimination of restrictive prefer-
ential ROOs on substantially all the trade in Kaesong products.349 
d. The Meaning of “Eliminated” in Article XXIV:8 
 The last key term in Article XXIV:8(b) that warrants examination 
is “eliminated.”350 The Oxford English Dictionary defines “eliminate” as 
“completely remov[ing] or get[ting] rid of.”351 Therefore, using this 
ordinary meaning, Article XXIV:8(b) requires the parties entering into 
a GATT-compliant FTA to completely remove the duties and ORRCs on 
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substantially all the trade in the products originating in the territories 
of the FTA parties.352 In other words, Article XXIV:8(b) does not re-
quire or justify any modification of restrictive regulations beyond making 
them nonrestrictive.353 
 For example, reducing a tariff until the rate of duty is zero is “elim-
ination of duty.” In other words, zero rate of duty is nonrestrictive. 
However, if a tariff is reduced beyond zero, it is no longer elimination 
of duty. Rather, it becomes an import subsidy. Although an import sub-
sidy may not be restrictive to the trade of the country to which it is of-
fered, it discriminates against the imports from other countries. There-
fore, Article XXIV cannot justify an import subsidy as a measure to 
eliminate restrictive regulations. 
 Similarly, the elimination of restrictive preferential ROOs can only 
justify duty-free treatment of the products originating in the territories 
of the FTA parties. When preferential ROOs are modified to offer duty-
free treatment to the products that do not originate in the FTA parties, 
the modification is not “elimination of restrictive regulations.” Rather, 
such modification amounts to creation of privileges and benefits pro-
hibited by the MFN principle. While these preferential ROOs may not 
restrict the trade between the FTA partners, they may discriminate 
against products imported from the third-party countries that are not 
offered duty-free treatment under the FTA. 
 The panel in Canada–Auto stated that “Article XXIV clearly cannot 
justify a measure which grants WTO-inconsistent duty-free treatment to 
products originating in third countries not parties to a customs union 
or free trade.”354 Thus, at least one WTO panel has found that prefer-
ential ROOs allowing preferential tariff treatment to the products orig-
inating in a third-party country cannot be considered elimination of 
ORRCs.355 
 Therefore, if the OP provisions contained in South Korean FTAs 
cover products that originate in FTA member-nation territory (as de-
termined by either preferential ROOs or neutral ROOs), the OP provi-
sions violate the WTO, since they do more than eliminating ORRCs un-
der Article XXIV.356 In sum, although the OP provisions do not prevent 
the South Korean FTAs from meeting the internal requirement under 
                                                                                                                      
352 See id.; see also GATT, supra note 13, art. XXIV:8(b). 
353 See GATT, supra note 13, art. XXIV:8(b); Kim & Kim, supra note 253, at 626–31. 
354 See Canada-Autos Panel, supra note 161, ¶ 10.55. 
355 See id. 
356 See id. 
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Article XXIV, the internal requirement does not justify the OP provi-
sion either. 
3. Introduced Upon Formation of a Free Trade Area 
 The two-pronged test developed by the Appellate Body in Turkey-
Textiles requires that the measure at issue be introduced upon the for-
mation of a GATT-compliant free-trade area in order to benefit from an 
Article XXIV defense.357 This implies that measures adopted subse-
quent to the formation of a free-trade area cannot benefit from an Ar-
ticle XXIV defense.358 
 All OP provisions in the South Korean FTAs are introduced upon 
formation of one or another free-trade area, and there is no evidence 
that any of those free-trade areas has failed to meet the external and 
internal requirements under Article XXIV.359 However, some South 
Korean FTAs provide for the establishment of a special committee for 
the purpose of discussing the possibility of adopting OP provisions.360 
Those committees may, someday, decide to adopt OP provisions. If 
those OP provisions are adopted at a later date, a future panel may de-
termine that the OP provisions were implicitly introduced upon the 
formation of the free-trade area, because of the preexisting special 
agreement providing for possible future OP provisions.361 These new 
OP provisions, however, may not be considered to have been intro-
duced upon formation of a free-trade area, since they technically were 
not part of the initial FTAs.362 
C. The Second Prong of the Turkey-Textiles Test: Necessity 
 The second prong of the test developed by the Appellate Body in 
Turkey-Textiles suggests that, even if a particular measure was introduced 
upon the formation of a free-trade area that meets both the external 
and internal requirements under Article XXIV, the measure is not justi-
                                                                                                                      
357 See Turkey-Textiles AB, supra note 226, ¶ 46. 
358 See id.; Trebilcock, supra note 18, at 115. 
359 See Korean FTA Status, supra note 1. 
360 See id. The FTAs with the United States, the EU, and Turkey provide that a special 
committee be set up for discussing the possibility of adopting OP provisions in the future. See 
KORUS FTA, supra note 70; Agreement on Trade in Goods, S. Kor.-Turk., annex IV, available 
at http://www.customs.go.kr/kcshome/main/content/Content View.do?contentId=CON 
TENT_ID_000002366&layoutMenuNo=23274 [hereinafter Korea-Turkey FTA]. 
361 See Turkey-Textiles AB, supra note 226, ¶ 46; Korea-Turkey FTA, supra note 360. 
362 See Turkey-Textiles AB, supra note 226, ¶ 226; Korea-Turkey FTA, supra note 360. See 
also Korean FTA Status, supra note 1. 
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fied under an Article XXIV defense unless exclusion of the measure 
would prevent the formation of the free-trade area.363 In other words, if 
an FTA can meet both the external and internal requirements without 
the particular measure at issue, exclusion of the measure does not pre-
vent the formation of a GATT-compliant FTA and an Article XXIV de-
fense is not available.364 
 A measure must be necessary for any FTA in order for the Article 
XXIV defense to apply; the mere fact that the measure is necessary for 
the particular, or particularly desired, FTA is not enough to claim the 
Article XXIV defense.365 In Turkey-Textiles, the Appellate Body denied an 
Article XXIV defense because while the desired measures were neces-
sary for the formation of a particular type of customs union, the measures 
were not necessary for the formation of any type of customs union.366 In 
that case, although Turkey wanted to create a “free circulation” type of 
customs union with the EC, the Appellate Body ruled that the formation 
of a customs union would not have been prevented if the quotas against 
Indian textile products were not introduced because Turkey could have 
implemented ROOs instead.367 The Appellate Body did not address the 
fact that such ROOs would require administration and, therefore, pre-
vent the formation of the type of customs union Turkey wanted—i.e., a 
customs union without internal border controls.368 This means that 
even if the parties to the South Korean FTAs intended to create free-
trade areas with particularly inclusive preferential ROOs, their inten-
tions do not affect determination of whether such preferential ROOs 
are an essential part of GATT-compliant FTAs.369 
                                                                                                                     
 So, under the second prong of the Turkey-Textiles test, if the OP 
provisions are not necessary for the South Korean FTAs to meet the 
external and internal requirements under Article XXIV, then they are 
not permitted.370 As discussed above, Article XXIV does not impose any 
external requirement on the preferential ROOs contained in a newly 
formed FTA.371 The internal requirement demands that preferential 
ROOs are not substantially more restrictive than non-preferential 
 
363 See Turkey-Textiles AB, supra note 226, ¶ 58. 
364 See id. 
365 See id. 
366 See Turkey-Textiles AB, supra note 226, ¶ 58; Trebilcock, supra note 18, at 116. 
367 See Trebilcock, supra note 18, at 116. 
368 Id. 
369See Turkey-Textiles AB, supra note 226, ¶ 58. 
370 See Turkey-Textiles AB, supra note 226, ¶ 58. 
371 See supra notes 230–292 and accompanying text. 
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ROOs or neutral ROOs.372 Yet, the OP provisions are not justified as an 
effort to eliminate restrictive preferential ROOs, because the trade in 
Kaesong products does not constitute a substantial part of the trade in 
the products originating in South Korea.373 Therefore, OP provisions 
are not necessary for the existence of South Korean FTAs.374 
 Some may argue that OP provisions are necessary, because even 
though the South Korean FTAs can meet the external and internal re-
quirements under Article XXIV without the OP provisions, they are 
essential parts of the South Korean FTA due to the political importance 
of the KIC in inter-Korean relations and the security of the region.375 
While the purposive language of Article XXIV does not look to consid-
erations other than trade liberalization and protection of the trade of 
third-party countries to determine whether a provision is “necessary,”376 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention states that a treaty “shall be inter-
preted . . . in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
terms of the treaty in their context.”377 Article XXI:(b)(iii) of the GATT 
provides that nothing in the GATT “shall be construed . . . to prevent 
any contracting party from taking any action which it considers neces-
sary for the protection of its essential security interests . . . taken in time 
of war or other emergency in international relations.”378 Of course, 
South Korea’s FTA partners may not invoke the Article XXI:(b)(iii) 
defense directly because the success of the KIC is not related to their 
security interests.379 Since South Korea is still technically at war with 
North Korea, however,380 South Korea’s FTA partners may argue that 
                                                                                                                      
372 See Kim & Kim, supra note 253, at 630; supra notes 293–385 and accompanying text. 
373 Compare Republic of Korea, Economic Bulletin Vol. 35. No. 10 18 (2010), http:// 
www.korea.net/Resources/Publications/Economic-Bulletins/view?articleId=3692 (indicat-
ing exports from the Republic of Korea totaled US$46.38 billion in August 2013), with Koreas 
Restart Operations at Kaesong Industrial Zone, BBC News Asia (Sep. 16, 2013), http://www. 
bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-24104774 (noting that the Kaesong Industrial Complex reopened 
in September 2013 after a several month shutdown). 
374 See Turkey-Textiles AB, supra note 226, ¶ 46. 
375 See Lim, supra note 9, at v (“People who have studied the KIC are beginning to real-
ize its vital role and are calling the process a ‘mini-reunification.’ They are hoping that the 
joint-business project between North and South Korea will jump-start the unification proc-
ess in the Korean Peninsula.”). 
376 See GATT, supra note 13, art. XXIV:4; Understanding on Article XXIV, supra note 
219, pmbl. 
377 Vienna Convention, supra note 144, art. 31.1 (emphasis added). 
378 GATT, supra note 13, art. XXI:(b)(iii). 
379 See id. 
380 North Korea Profile, supra note 68, at 4 (“[A]n armistice was signed on July 27, 
1953, and a demilitarized zone (DMZ) was established at the thirty-eighth parallel. The 
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the term “necessary” in Article XXIV:5 should be interpreted in light of 
the security concerns in the Korean peninsula.381 The strength of this 
argument, however, is questionable.382 
 In sum, even if the parties defending the South Korean OP provi-
sions meet both the internal and external requirements of the first 
prong of the Turkey-Textiles test for invoking an Article XXIV defense, 
they most likely will fail the second prong, because the OP provisions 
are not necessary for the formation of the South Korean FTAs.383 
Conclusion 
 The South Korean OP provisions may violate the MFN principle in 
Article I:1 of the GATT because they confer advantages to the products 
originating in North Korea within the meaning of Article I:1 and the 
same advantage is not conferred to the products originating in all other 
WTO members. 
 To defend the violation complaint, South Korea’s FTA partners 
may argue that the discriminatory effects of the OP provisions did not 
directly or indirectly nullify or impair the benefits accruing to the com-
plainant under GATT. This argument, however, is unlikely to succeed. 
 Alternatively, the respondent may raise a defense under Article 
XXIV of the GATT. To invoke an Article XXIV defense, the respondent 
must prove: (1) the measure at issue was introduced upon the forma-
tion of a GATT-compliant free-trade area; and (2) the measure at issue 
is an essential part of the free-trade area. There is no evidence that the 
South Korean FTAs fail to meet the external or internal requirement 
under the first prong of Article XXIV. Therefore, they might be GATT-
compliant. 
 The OP provisions ultimately violate the GATT, however, because 
they are not essential parts of the South Korean FTAs. They are not es-
                                                                                                                      
armistice and the heavily guarded DMZ are still in effect and are symbolic of . . . the divi-
sion of the Korean Peninsula . . . .”) Id. 
381 See Peter Lindsay, The Ambiguity of GATT Article XXI: Subtle Success or Rampant Fail-
ure?, 52 Duke L.J. 1276, 1277 (2003) (“This exception confers a potentially broad grant of 
authority, because the GATT does not define critical terms such as ‘considers necessary,’ 
‘essential security interests,’ ‘time of war,’ and ‘emergency in international relations.’ Con-
sequently, the scope of the ‘war’ and ‘emergency’ exception in Article XXI is not readily 
discernible. Similarly, the fact that a WTO member may take any action to protect ‘essen-
tial’ interests that ‘it considers necessary’ leaves open the question of whether the use of 
Article XXI is subject to review by a WTO panel.”). 
382 Cf. Trebilcock, supra note 18, at 115-16 (explaining how the necessity test has 
been interpreted in the past, which would shed light on the strength of the argument). 
383 Cf. id. 
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sential because they are not necessary for the South Korean FTAs to 
meet the external and internal requirements under Article XXIV. 
Therefore, once a prima facie case is made that the OP provisions violate 
the MFN principle in Article I:1 of the GATT, an Article XXIV defense 
will not be available. 
 One day, the WTO may adopt a new exemption from the MFN 
principle for OP. Until then, however, the existing South Korean OP 
provisions are likely to be in violation of WTO law. 
